Studies of variants of "motor voter" that were adopted by some states prior to NVRA's passage forecast significant, if modest, turnout impacts (Knack, 1995; Rhine, 1995) . Because driver's license cycles last 3 to 5 years in most states, motor voter cannot be judged on the basis of one election. Nevertheless, the record low turnout in 1996--the first election following implementation of NVRA--understandably deepens the suspicions of many analysts that many Americans simply aren't interested in voting, however easy it becomes. Turnout in North Dakota, which does not even have voter registration, fell to 56% of the voting-age population in
1996.
The impact of NVRA cannot be fully analyzed until motor voter programs are fully mature, by the 2000 election. Even then, with dramatically liberalized registration procedures in all states, disentangling the impact of the NVRA from other factors will be difficult.
Paradoxically, the NVRA has provided the best opportunity in a generation to analyze the effects of election-day registration. States could escape NVRA mandates only if they had universal election-day registration at the polls prior to the 1994 elections. Idaho, New
Hampshire, and Wyoming took Congress up on this offer, all implementing EDR prior to the 1994 election. These states constitute a second wave of states adopting EDR, with Maine, Minnesota, Oregon and Wisconsin all having adopted it in the mid-1970s.
i Election-day registration at the polls eliminates registration as a separate step in voting, so it provides a upper-bound estimate of the eventual impact of NVRA reforms--which although drastically reducing the inconvenience of registering to vote, will not register everybody, leaving some otherwise-eligible citizens without the option of going to the polls when they wake up on election day.
ii
The impact of EDR is immediate and permanent (Fenster, 1994) , unlike "motor voter," making its effects easier to estimate. 1994, and between 1992 and 1996 , using appropriate control groups.
Because of the time-series dimension to the analysis, numerous other factors influencing turnout are implicitly held constant in these comparisons (Fenster, 1994) . However, multivariate tests of turnout change are also conducted, so that statistical controls as well as research design controls are employed.
The impact of EDR on turnout is not particularly controversial: the best studies, reviewed below, have produced fairly consistent estimates. All of these estimates, however, have been dependent on a very small number of states adopting (or dropping) EDR over time; similar estimates produced by additional states would contribute to resolving this generalizability issue.
Moreover, all of the previous studies have neglected important idiosyncratic features of these states' EDR programs and registration histories, described in the next section. The NVRA-induced adoption of EDR by Idaho, New Hampshire, and Wyoming nearly doubles the number of "natural experiments" for evaluating its turnout effects.
EDR: The First Wave
This section briefly reviews evidence on the first wave, and examines the four states adopting EDR in the early 1970s more closely. (Smolka, 1977) . Thus, EDR's turnout effects should be about 50% greater if adopted in states in which all voters were previously required to register.
Of the four first wave EDR states, only Minnesota and Wisconsin adopted universal election-day registration at the polls. In Oregon, election-day registrants had to register at another location before going to the polls. The same was and still is true for larger urban centers in Maine, iv although these apparently account for less than half of the state's population. Deleting
Oregon from the EDR group yields a mean turnout increase in 1976 of 3.4 percentage points, producing an estimated turnout impact of about 5 percentage points. Teixeira (1992) , and Mitchell and Wlezian (1995) using survey data, produce estimates ranging from 3 to 6 percentage points.
vi None of these studies account for the fact that EDR could not have had any effect on one third of Minnesota and Wisconsin residents, who were not required to register at all before the advent of EDR. Likewise, none account for the fact that a sizeable fraction of Maine voters cannot register at the polls on election day. Most of these studies--by classifying Oregon as EDR --do not account for the fact that no voters could register at the polls on election day in that state.
The Second Wave: Evidence from Midterm Elections
Because the three new EDR states required all residents to register previously and adopted state-wide election-day registration at the polls, a natural hypothesis is that turnout may increase by more in this second EDR wave than in the earlier wave. In fact, estimates detailed below range from about 3 to 6 percentage points --remarkably similar to those generated from the first wave of EDR adoption.
As shown in Although implementation of NVRA-mandated programs began only in early 1995, 11
states had adopted effective "motor voter" programs prior to NVRA passage, with 8 of these new enough to influence turnout differences between 1990 and 1994. vii Subtracting these 8 states creates a control group of 40 states with no major registration reforms between 1990 and 1994.
As shown in is not significant (p=.37).
Even in these 40 "non-reform" states, there were minor reforms in some, such as allowing mail-in registration, or making registration forms available on request at various government offices. Although mail-in and "passive" versions of agency and motor voter programs appear to have little effect on turnout (e.g., Knack, 1995) , it is useful to examine a more pure four-state control group: the three "old" EDR states and North Dakota (which has long had no registration requirement The multiple regression analysis reported in Table 4 Part of any election-to-election change in turnout could simply reflect a "regression to the mean" effect in which states with unusually high or low turnout levels in the previous election move back toward their norms. The negative and significant coefficient on 1990 turnout in Table   4 is consistent with this hypothesis: on average, each 3 percentage-point increment in the level of turnout in 1990 is associated with a 1-point drop between the 1990 and 1994 elections.
The Senate dummy is coded +1 for states with a Senate contest in 1994 but not in 1990, and -1 for states with a contest in 1990 but not in 1994; all other states are coded 0. The regression coefficient thus estimates the turnout impact of adding a Senate contest to a given state's ballot. The multiple regression analysis of Table 6 produces a smaller, but statistically significant, estimate of 3 percentage points for EDR's turnout-enhancing impact. This regression is closely analogous to that of Table 4 , but with turnout change from 1992 to 1996 as the dependent variable, instead of 1990-94 turnout change.
Other than the smaller EDR coefficient, results in Table 6 differ from those of Minnesota and Wisconsin residents were not required to register even before the advent of EDR.
Voters in Oregon and in parts of Maine could register on election day, but not at the polls. All four states were historically high turnout states, subjecting any cross-sectional estimates to omitted variable bias. Despite these characteristics of first-wave states, estimates of EDR's turnout impact generated by the second wave of EDR implementation are remarkably similar to those produced by studies of the earlier wave, varying from about 3 to 6 percentage points.
While perhaps reassuring from an empirical researcher's point of view, these findings must be disappointing to reform advocates who hoped for much larger increases in turnout from the NVRA. Because most but not all eligible persons will eventually be registered by motor voter and other programs in the NVRA states, one can interpret EDR's impact as an upper-bound estimate of NVRA's turnout impact. Turnout in the 1996 election certainly provides no reason to suspect that 3-6 percentage points is too modest a prediction. While not a full test of brand-new motor voter programs, the experience of 1996 suggests that most new registrants will not vote.
A final cautionary note is that all of the EDR states, from both waves, tended to have above-average turnout rates even prior to their adoption of EDR. Reforms in lower-turnout states may eventually prove to have larger percentage-point impacts, simply because they are starting from a lower base. ii. On the other hand, the names of motor voter registrants (but not election-day registrants) appear on lists that can be obtained by parties and used in get-out-the-vote efforts. Voter registration lists identify the party affiliations of registrants in about half of the states, including ME, NH and OR but not ID, MN, WI or WY among the EDR states.
iii. The timing of Senate contests is a possible explanation for the relative showings of Oregon and
Wisconsin. Oregon had a Senate race in 1972 but not in 1976, which might have contributed to the turnout decline in that state. Wisconsin, which had the largest turnout increase from 1972 to 1976, had no Senate contest on the ballot in 1972 but had one in 1976. In any event, the turnout effects of Senate races appears to be modest (Knack, 1995; Rhine, 1995; Cox & Munger, 1989; Boyd, 1981) . Senate and gubernatorial races are controlled for explicitly in multivariate tests below.
iv. Maine, unlike other current EDR states, is ineligible for a waiver from NVRA mandates because it does not have universal election-day registration at the polls.
v. Ideally, the turnout effects of the second wave of EDR eventually could be tested in a similar manner. At a minimum, replication of Fenster's method for the second EDR wave would require waiting until several more elections have occurred. Even then, disentangling EDR's effects from that of the NVRA would be highly problematic.
vi. Fenster did not include Oregon as an EDR state. Rhine (1995) and Brians (1997) classify
Oregon as having EDR from 1976 through 1986. Statutes indicate that the state legislature instituted a day-before-election-day deadline in 1985, in effect in the 1986 election, during which voters approved an initiative restoring the pre-1976 20-day deadline (Crocker, 1996 ; also see Oregon Revised Statutes, 247.025). Fenster uses a simple EDR/non-EDR dichotomy. All of the other studies cited estimate EDR's effects using the variable "closing date" which varies from 0 (for EDR states) up to 30 or more days. Brians (1997) confirms the intuitive expectation that the impact of closing date is highly non-linear: closing the registration rolls 30 days prior to election day is estimated to reduce turnout by little more than a 30-day closing date. The effects of instituting EDR will vary slightly by state, however, as previous closing dates differ.
in effect for a full driver's license cycle by the 1990 election. "Passive" programs that require applicants for drivers' licenses to ask for registration forms are not classified here as motor voter, nor are nominally "active" programs in NJ, OH and WV which apparently were not fully implemented.
viii. Evidence on gubernatorial contests on a state's ballot varies widely. They are associated with a turnout increase of just under 2 percentage points in Rhine (1995) and Knack (1995) , who use state-level data from the 1970s through 1992 and control for fixed state effects. When presidential years are separated from midterm years, this positive effect surprisingly is found to hold only for the presidential years (Knack, 1995) . Cox and Munger (1989) find small (about 1 percentage point) and only marginally significant effects (p values of about .10 for two-tailed tests)
for Senate and gubernatorial races, using congressional-district level data for the 1982 election. Boyd (1981) , perhaps the best-known study of election-calendar effects, finds that concurrent gubernatorial elections raise a state's turnout by nearly 6 percentage points while Senate contests have no effect. However, he uses survey data (from the 1980 National Election Studies)
representing only one election and only about 30 states.
ix. State-level data on other demographic variables, such as educational attainment, age and residential mobility, are unavailable for non-Census years. White's (1980) method. *Significant at .05, 2-tailed test; **Significant at .01, 2-tailed test.
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